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Abstract
Contemporary democratization process challenges the trends of regress or stagnation 
in the world. The Central European Countries face this problem as well, yet they differ 
in the depth of changes. The article addresses the problems of quality of democracy re-
garded as a political regime and the values of constitutional order of the Czech Republic 
and Hungary. As post-communist, the two countries have been regarded as democratic 
leaders for a long time. But the Czech Republic has the same Constitution from the be-
ginning of democratization process, while Hungary passed the new Constitution in 2011. 
The Czech constitutional order reflects liberal democratic rules and values both in axio-
logical and institutional dimension. The Hungarian one mirrors conservative and illib-
eral axiological values. In the institutional dimension both constitutions seem to main-
tain specific democratic regime, but in Hungary the executive power is dominant. The 
methods used in the research were: analysis, synthesis, institutional approach and com-
parative method.
1 ORCID ID: 0000-0002-7609-4002, Ph.D., D.Sc., Institute of Political Sciences, Fac-
ulty of Social Sciences, University of Silesia in Katowice, e-mail: sebastian.kubaas@us.edu.pl.
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Streszczenie
Porządek konstytucyjny Czech i Węgier w świetle analizy porównawczej 
w odniesieniu do procesu demokratyzacji i jego stagnacji
Współczesny proces demokratyzacji na świecie napotyka od pewnego czasu na przeszko-
dy prowadzące do jego stagnacji, czy nawet regresu. Tendencja ta widoczna jest także 
w państwach Europy Środkowej. Artykuł podejmuje analizę jakości demokracji rozu-
mianej w sensie substancjalnym i proceduralnym, jaką odzwierciedlają czeska i węgier-
ska konstytucje. Po 1989 roku przez długi okres czasu państwa te były określane mianem 
liderów demokratyzacji. Obecnie czeski porządek konstytucyjny opiera się na założe-
niach Konstytucji uchwalonej na początku procesu demokratyzacji (1992 r.), a węgier-
ski porządek reguluje Konstytucja uchwalona po dwóch dekadach od rozpoczęcia tegoż 
procesu (2011 r.). W wymiarze aksjologicznym czeska Konstytucja opiera się na warto-
ściach demokratycznych i liberalnych, natomiast węgierska na konserwatywnych, tra-
dycyjnych, a nawet nieliberalnych. W wymiarze instytucjonalnym obydwie Konstytucje 
gwarantują funkcjonowanie reżimu demokratycznego, z tym, że w przypadku węgier-
skim mamy do czynienia z dominacją egzekutywy rządowej, a w Czechach z modelem 
parlamentarnym. Metodami stosowanymi w procesie badawczym były: analiza i synte-
za, podejście instytucjonalne i metoda porównawcza.
*
I.
Today, we observe strong backslide of democracy in the world. The first 
signs of democratic regression were noticed more than a decade ago. Jacques 
Rupnik noticed then the development of negative attitudes towards lib-
eral democracy which had been coming both from society and political 
elites2. The democratic regression has been accompanied by weakening 
of support for liberal values connected with universalism and individu-
alism. Yet, from the other side there has been global appreciation for al-
ternative values such as: glorification of state authority, patrimonialism, 
2 J. Rupnik, From Democracy Fatigue to Populist Backslash, “Journal of Democracy” 
2007, No. 18 (4), pp. 17–25.
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primacy of the majority principle, devaluation of minority rights3. There 
are three approaches to analyze global democratic changes. The first one 
underlines that the changes are temporal and will fade sooner or later4. 
The second one clearly states that democracy backslide transforms the re-
gime broader, wider and deeper and leads to a new situation5. The third 
approach is rather careful because does not point neither at deeper dem-
ocratic changes nor at temporal one6.
The trend of democratic backslide takes place in Central Europe. In 
2007 Ivan Krastev noticed the end of liberal democratic era in this region7. 
Even though his observation might have seemed then a bit exaggerated, 
today no one or almost no one has any objections to the truth of thesis of 
democracy deterioration in Central Europe8. Nowadays the independent 
democracy indexes say that external evaluation of democracy function-
ing in the region is worsening, no matter if we take a look at more or less 
democratic consolidated countries. Considering the two Central Euro-
pean countries that are the subject of this analysis, the democratic back-
slide or at least stagnation is present in both. In the case of Czech Repub-
lic in the decade 2009–2018 the democracy score measured by Nations in 
Transit dropped from 2.18 to 2.29 (which gives deterioration of 1.8%). In 
3 R.S. Foa, Y. Mounk, The Democratic Disconnect, “Journal of Democracy” 2016, No. 27 
(3), pp. 5–17.
4 L. Diamond, Facing up to the Democratic Recession, [in:] Democracy in Decline?, eds. 
L. Diamond, M.F. Plattner, Baltimore 2015, pp. 98–115; S. Levitsky, L. Way, The myth of 
democratic recession, [in:] Democracy in Decline?, eds. L. Diamond, M.F. Plattner, Baltimore 
2015, pp. 58–76.
5 A. Cooley, Countering democratic norms, “Journal of Democracy” 2015, No. 26(3), 
pp. 49–63.
6 S. Berman, The Pipe dream of undemocratic liberalism, “Journal of Democracy” 2017, 
No. 28(3), pp. 29–38; P.C. Schmitter, Crisis and transition, but not decline, [in:] Democracy in 
Decline?, eds. L. Diamond, M.F. Plattner, Baltimore 2015, pp. 39–57.
7 I. Krastev, The strange death of liberal consensus, “Journal of Democracy” 2007, No. 18 
(4), pp. 56–63.
8 L. Cianetti, J. Dawson, S. Hanley, Rethinking “Democratic backslide” in Central and 
Eastern Europe – Looking beyond Hungary and Poland, “East European Politics” 2018, No. 34 
(3), pp. 243–256; I. Krastev, The Unravelling of the Post-1989 order, “Journal of Democracy”, 
No. 27 (4), pp. 5–15; J. Rupnik, Explaining Eastern Europe. The Crisis of Liberalism, “Journal 
of Democracy” 2018, No. 29 (3), pp. 24–38.
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Hungary the decrease is very huge as the democracy score dropped from 
2.29 to 3.71 (23.7%). The Hungarian example is specific because after 2015 
this country fell apart from the group of consolidated into semi-consol-
idated democracies9.
The reason of analyzing Czech and Hungarian examples is based on geo-
graphical, historical and contemporary reasons. Geographically, both coun-
tries are situated in Central Europe and belong to the Visegrad Group Coun-
tries. Historically, the ties between the Czech Republic and Hungary started 
more than a thousand years ago. The relations were developing both as the 
countries were independent or belonged to the Habsburg imperium. Contem-
porary reasons of choosing the Czech Republic and Hungary refer to the im-
pact of socialism collapse in 1989 and the three decades of democratization 
process aftermath. Yet, there is another and even more important reason of 
choosing the Czech Republic and Hungary. When we compare the two exam-
ples we can clearly see that even though they were the leaders of the democ-
ratization process in Central Europe for a long time, today only the Czech 
Republic stays embedded democracy while the democratic backslide in Hun-
gary leads this country to a regime of defective democracy.
The subject of the analysis is tracing the constitutional pattern regarded 
as the foundation of democratic frame of state in the Czech Republic and 
Hungary. As mentioned, nowadays we observe the lack of the belief in the 
primacy of liberal democratic constitutionalism. In democracy the consti-
tution mirrors the will of sovereign nation transformed by representatives. 
The thesis of the article assumes that the character of Czech and Hungarian 
constitutions reflects the view on democracy represented by political elites 
that were responsible for passing the Constitutions. Regarding the thesis, 
I ask two questions:
 – what conditions accompanied the process of working out and passing 
the constitutions in the Czech Republic and Hungary?
 – what is the specific content, form and position of the Constitutions in 
two analyzed countries from contemporary perspective in the light of 
the quality of democracy and its stagnation?
9 Freedom House, Nations in Transit (2018), https://freedomhouse.org/report/na-
tions-transit/nations-transit-2018 (October 2, 2019).
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II.
In the literature the democratization process is described as multistage and 
multidimensional. In chronological dimension democratization process starts 
with the erosion of non-democratic regime, then transition appears and the 
last stage is democratic consolidation. In dimensional aspect democratiza-
tion process refers to institutional, political, cultural, social and economic 
fields10. Today, as it was mentioned in the first part of the article, we observe 
the democratic backslide which deteriorates liberal democratic achievements. 
The concept of the backslide of democracy can be named as de-democrati-
zation. According to Matthijs Boghaards de-democratization is a starting 
point of weakening democracy regime which then becomes a continuous 
process11. This process can change one or more public spheres. In the Wolf-
gang Merkel’s concept of defective democracy, which is the effect of demo-
cratic backslide, there are four types of defective democracy. First, exclusive 
democracy assumes that electoral law and participation are limited. Second, 
illiberal democracy suspends civil rights. Third, delegative democracy dimin-
ishes horizontal accountability. Fourth, domain democracy allows a govern-
ment to control other state authorities12.
From the perspective of process of working out a constitution and its im-
plementation, the transition is a crucial democratization stage. It is in the 
middle between non-democratic regime erosion and democratic consolida-
tion. Transition lasts only few years and its main aim is to make an institu-
tional pattern for future democracy. Geoffrey Pridham argues that this pat-
tern mostly depends on creation of constitution13. Andrzej Antoszewski says 
that there are two main models of creating a constitution. The first one is the 
effect of the strategy of consolidation. The old, non-democratic elites are able 
to agree with the new emerging democratic ones on how to implement rules, 
10 A. Ágh, Emerging Democracies in East Central Europe and the Balkans, Cheltenham 
1998; G. Pridham, Dynamics of Democratization. A Comparative Approach, New York 2000; 
L. Whitehead, Democratization. Theory and Experience, Oxford 2002.
11 M. Bogaards, De-democratization in Hungary: Diffusely Defective Democracy, “Democ-
ratization” 2018, No. 25 (18), pp. 1481–1499.
12 W. Merkel, Embedded and Defective Democracies, “Democratization” 2005, No. 11 
(5), pp. 33–58.
13 G. Pridham, op.cit., p. 19.
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procedures and values that will serve as the democratic basis regime. The sec-
ond model is confrontational because there is an open rivalry among differ-
ent groups of elites which make it impossible to agree on a negotiated form of 
constitution. In effect, a new constitution cannot be created or can be passed 
later on when one political party subordinate public life14.
III.
The major changes in Central and Eastern Europe began in 1989. As Ralf 
Dahrendorf pointed, the transformation has matched three elements: free 
elections founding the law-based rule, market economy and civil society15. 
The most essential aspect from the state point of view referred to the necessi-
ty of establishing institutional pattern (law-based frame). After 1989 all Cen-
tral and Eastern European countries have decided to choose democratic re-
gime and were responsible for passing new constitutions, yet not all of them 
were able to trace steps of changes after that. Some of them gave up in the 90. 
XX century while others faced de-democratization during global recession 
of democracy in the XXI century.
Tadeusz Mołdawa argues that new constitutions opposed the socialist 
ones and were based both on Western European solutions and own histori-
cal and traditional achievements. The constitutions accepted tripartite divi-
sion of powers, political pluralism, free market, the rule of law and value of 
legitimacy. They restored old national and state symbols as well16.
Czech Republic has a long and rich history of constitutionalism. First 
modern lessons from learning how to define state structure basing on stable 
rules were learnt in the Habsburg imperium. After its collapse, great effort of 
Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk led to create a new state of Czechoslovakia. The First 
Czechoslovak Republic was founded on democratic regime and the Consti-
14 A. Antoszewski, Konstytucja w świetle refleksji politologicznej, [in:] Nowa Konstytucja 
RP. Wartość, jednostka, instytucje, ed. K.B. Janowski, Toruń 1992, p. 38.
15 W. Merkel, op.cit., pp. 1481–1499.
16 T. Mołdawa, Konstytucjonalizm państw Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, [in:] Zagadnie-
nia konstytucjonalizmu krajów Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, ed. T. Mołdawa. Warsaw 2003, 
pp. 12–13.
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tution from February 29, 1920. To 1938 this Constitution enabled to preserve 
democracy. Czechoslovakia was the only democratic country in Central and 
Eastern Europe which survived as a democratic one throughout almost en-
tire interwar period. After the Second World War, communist Czechoslova-
kia had two constitutions: 1948 and 1960. In the end of socialist period, dur-
ing the non-democratic erosion the political elites initiated works on changing 
Constitution. Although this fact, they did not reach the aim, yet with coop-
eration with democratic opposition they passed four constitutional bills in 
1989 that reshaped rigid socialist regime17. On January 9, 1991, Federal As-
sembly passed the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Basic Freedoms. Lat-
er on, in the Czech Republic this act became integral part of constitutional 
order, but formally was not included to the Czech constitution. Up until the 
end of Czechoslovakia Federal Assembly did not create a constitution. The 
works were slow and torn by different Czech and Slovak points of view. After 
making the final decision on splitting the two nations in 1992, Czechs accel-
erated the works on constitution. In the regional Czech Council new consti-
tutional commission was formed. All parliamentary organizations and par-
ties worked on new constitution (leftist: Levý blok and ČSSD, liberal LSU, 
Christian-democratic KDU-ČSL and KDS, regional party HSD-SMS, right-
ist: ODA and ODS and radical SPR-RSČ). According to Andrzej Antoszewski 
the Czech model of working out a constitution follows the strategy of con-
solidation. During the voting on the Constitution in the Czech Council 172 
deputies were for, while 16 against and 10 abstained18. So, it is worth underly-
ing that the contemporary Czech Constitution was made when formally this 
country did not exist. Regional parliament passed the Constitution on De-
cember 16 and the Czech Republic was born on January 1, 1993.
The history of Hungarian constitutional acts, although not called consti-
tutions, is as long as the Hungarian statehood and begins in 1222 with the 
Aranybulla19. In more contemporary times, in the erosion of non-democrat-
ic regime, the socialist elites wanted to prepare new and more modern con-
17 M. Bankowicz, Transformacje konstytucyjnych systemów władzy państwowej w Europie 
Środkowej, Cracov 2010, p. 78.
18 K. Skotnicki, System konstytucyjny Czech, Warsaw 2000, p. 14, 20.
19 D. Héjj, Konstytucja Węgier jako manifest polityczny parlamentarnej większości, „Prze-
gląd Prawa Konstutcyjnego” 2018, No. 1 (41), p. 68.
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stitution replacing the one from 1949. The work was initiated in the end of 
198820. Yet, the dynamic situation made impossible to accomplish the work. 
The democratic opposition became stronger and socialist elites decided to ne-
gotiate the upcoming changes. The talks started on June 13, 1989 and finished 
on September 18, 1989. The final act which was to finish the talks was not ac-
cepted by all negotiating organizations. Although socialist elites and most of 
oppositional parties agreed, but oppositional Fidesz and SzDSz did not. Sum-
marizing, only minimal consensus was reached on the future changes. In the 
effect the constitution of 1949 was amended on October 18, 1989 by old so-
cialist parliament21. 70 out of 78 paragraphs were changed and then till 2011 
the constitution was amended 24 times22. According to András Körösényi, the 
constitutional pattern from 1989 implemented tripartite power division, par-
liamentary model, guarantees of human rights, free market economy23.
In 1990 the constitution order was amended by newly elected democrat-
ic parliament introducing democratic regime as a state base, and then in the 
following years new changes were introduced confirming the rule of demo-
cratic state of law24. In 1995, MSzP (heir of communist party) initiated works 
on new constitution. This party had more than a half seats in the parliament, 
yet wanted the new constitution to be a common act of all parliamentary par-
ties which implicated whole society support. That is why MSzP passed the law 
that enabled to change the constitution only if 4/5 of parliamentary deputies 
agree. As it may be supposed it was never reached.
As a consequence, the 1989 constitutional order was permanently chal-
lenged. After 1998 the most oppositional party towards that order was Fidesz. 
In 2007 István Stumpf, who was a Fidesz government member between 1998–
20 Z. Ripp, The Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party. Towards the Multiparty System (June 
1987-February 1989), http://polhist.hu/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/8_ripp_regimes.pdf 
(October 4, 2019).
21 I. Halász, R. Grabowski, Hungarian Understanding of the Division of Powers, “Przegląd 
Prawa Konstytucyjnego” 2016, No. 6 (34), pp. 62–63.
22 J. Kis, Introduction: From the 1989 Constitution to the 2010 Fundamental Law, [in:] 
Constitution for a Disunited Nation. On Hungary’s 2011 Fundamental Law, ed. G.A. Tóth, 
Budapest 2011, p. 9.
23 A. Körösényi, Government and Politics in Hungary, Budapest 1999, pp. 162–167.
24 J. Bayer, The Process of Political System Change in Hungary, “Begegnungen: Schriftenrei-
he des Europa Institutes”, Budapest 2003, p. 172.
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2002, announced the necessity of constitutional order change. So, in 2010 
when this party got 2/3 seats in the parliament it was obvious that pre-elec-
tion promises of changing constitutional order would fulfill. Following the 
Fidesz electoral success in 2010, this party replaced the paragraph stating that 
only 4/5 of deputies can change constitution with 2/3. The parliament passed 
the Declaration of National Cooperation that announced the new constitu-
tional order. Then Fidesz decided to create National Consultation Commit-
tee outside the parliament to prepare a draft of constitution. Simultaneous-
ly, a parliamentary commission was made to work on a new constitution. 30 
out of 45 commission members belonged to Fidesz. But in the end of Decem-
ber 2010, all oppositional deputies withdrew from it. To get social support for 
the Fidesz draft of constitution National Consultation Committee sent ques-
tionnaires to 8 million Hungarians and received 900 thousand questionnaires 
back. March 14, 2010 National Consultation Committee presented the pro-
ject of new constitution in the parliament. On April 18, 2011 262 out of 386 
deputies agreed on the text of constitution. MSzP and LMP boycotted voting 
while Jobbik was against. April 25, 2011 president Pál Schmitt promulgated 
the highest law act25. The model of making and passing 2011 Hungarian Con-
stitution was confrontational.
IV.
Now let us try to analyze the two constitutions referring to their special form, 
special contents and the highest position in the hierarchy of acts in a law system.
Regarding special form of the Constitution of the Czech Republic it con-
sists of the following chapters: fundamental provisions, legislative power, ex-
ecutive power, judicial power, Supreme Control Office, Czech National Bank, 
territorial self-government, transitional and final provisions. The Constitu-
tion expresses liberal and democratic values that construct the frame of the 
law state. The changes and amendments can be made only through imple-
mentation of constitutional bills. The possibility of passing a new constitution 
25 S. Kubas, Węgierski parlamentaryzm: od narodzin do stanu obecnego z uwzględnieniem 
konstytucji z 2011 roku, „Przegląd Sejmowy” 2012, No. 5 (112), pp. 208–209.
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would be possible if 2/3 of deputies and 2/3 of senators agreed. Up to 2019 the 
Constitution was amended 9 times.
In the Hungarian case the beginning of the analysis must underline the 
formal name of Constitution which is the Fundamental Law. Axiologically 
the Fundamental Law supports conservative values26 while in the organiza-
tional aspect of state it confirms a democratic regime. There are five chapters 
in this act: preamble, foundation, freedom and responsibility, the state (e.g. 
the National Assembly, National Referendums, President, Government, the 
Constitutional Court, Courts, Local Governments), closing and miscellane-
ous provisions. Yet the internal division of chapters is made differently. 2/3 
of deputies can amend or change the Fundamental Law.
V.
The aspect of special contents is as follow. All citizens living in the Czech Re-
public are the subject of power which means that the sovereignty and inde-
pendence of people is included in the contents of Constitution27. The Consti-
tution bans the possibility of changing democratic regime. People can decide 
directly and indirectly on policy. The nation is the sovereign of power in Hun-
gary that implicates ethnic factor plays more important role than the concept 
of citizenship. So, all Hungarians including those living in the neighboring 
and other foreign countries are the sovereign of power. This concept can open 
the problem of the revisionism of borders28.
There is no direct reference to the type of economy both in the Czech Con-
stitution and Hungarian Fundamental Law. Yet in the latter there are more 
provisions of limiting the budgetary expenses in order to avoid deficit.
26 I. Halász, Święta Korona w węgierskiej Ustawie Zasadniczej z 2011 r., “Przegląd Prawa 
Konstytucyjnego” 2018, No. 1 (41), p. 54.
27 A. Albi, EU Enlargement and the Constitutions of Central and Eastern Europe, Cam-
bridge 2005.
28 M. Gnizadowski, A. Sadecki, Konstytucja nowych Węgier – implikacje krajowe i regionalne. 
Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich. Komentarz nr 60. https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/
komentarze-osw/2011–07–29/konstytucja-nowych-wegier-implikacje-krajowe-i-regionalne 
(29.09.2019).
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The Czech Constitution includes a specific solution connected with hu-
man rights and freedoms. When Constitution was passed in 1992, the 
deputies decided to include the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Basic 
Freedoms from 1991 as an inherent constitutional act. Krzysztof Skotnicki 
argues this is a very rare situation in the world29. This act consists of 44 ar-
ticles and covers human rights and fundamental freedoms, political rights, 
rights of national and ethnic minorities, economic, social and cultural rights 
and rights to judicial and other legal protection. Marek Bankowicz states 
the Charter guarantees all rights and freedoms that characterize modern 
democratic state of law30. The concept of human rights and freedoms in the 
Hungarian Fundamental Law goes backwards comparing the 1989 Consti-
tutional Order. Some rights are conditioned by the fact of individual subor-
dination to the Hungarian society. Moreover, state is responsible for guar-
anteeing natural rights while the natural rights should have more superior 
and general guarantees. If an individual contributes his work to the wealth 
of social community, then Hungarian state guarantees the social and eco-
nomic rights. There is ambiguity concerning the freedom of thought, con-
science and religion. The Fundamental Law guarantees such freedoms, yet 
in the preamble there is strong stress on traditional, Christian values that 
frame the Hungarian state.
Both countries are unitary. In the Czech Constitution there are such rules 
as: pluralism, majoritarian rule with the acceptance of minority rights, re-
publicanism and tripartite power division. Regarding the last one, legislative 
power belongs to parliament which consists of two chambers: Chamber of 
Deputies and Senate. 200 members of the Chamber of Deputies are elected 
every four years by citizens. This chamber initiates the legislative process and 
passes bills. 1/3 of 81 senators is elected every three years for six years’ term 
of office. Government and president belong to executive power. Government 
is elected by the Chamber of Deputies after president’s proposal. President is 
elected directly by citizens for five years’ term of office. The same person can 
be elected only for two terms of office. The highest institution of the judici-
29 K. Skotnicki, op.cit., p. 28.
30 M. Bankowicz, Systemy władzy państwowej Czechosłowacji i Czech. Studium instytuc-
jonalno-polityczne, Cracov 1998, p. 137.
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ary system is the Supreme Court31. Summarizing, the model of main state or-
gans is parliamentarism.
In Hungary the National Assembly is a one-chamber legislative body. 
There are 199 deputies elected every four years. Every five years the Na-
tional Assembly choses a president. One person can be elected on the post 
of president only twice. The National Assembly choses a government with 
the prime minister. The Fundamental Law states that the position of prime 
minister is privileged which implicates the chancellor’s model of the rela-
tions of the state organs. The highest court in the Hungarian judiciary sys-
tem is called Curia32.
The axiological basis of both constitutions is different and implicates the 
understanding of the character of law and public life order. The Preamble of 
Czech Constitution declares the primacy of old, good state tradition coming 
both from Czech and Czechoslovak sources. The state is secular, there are no 
religious references. In the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Basic Free-
doms there is an appreciation for democratic values and the ban of dominance 
of any other ideology33. The creators of the Hungarian Fundamental Law re-
ferred to Christian, traditional and conservative values which continue the 
idea of Hungarian statehood from the Middle Age until today. The idea of 
medieval Holy Crown embodies this continuity. The Fundamental Law does 
not recognize the period from 1944 to 1990 because it led to moral decay34. 
Both constitutions are the highest acts in their countries and enumerate oth-
er acts that are included in the constitutional order.
31 The Constitution of the Czech Republic. https://www.hrad.cz/en/czech-republic/con-
stitution-of-the-cr (29.09.2019).
32 The Fundamental Law of Hungary. https://www.kormany.hu/download/f/3e/61000/
TheFundamentalLawofHungary_20180629_FIN.pdf (29.09.2019).
33 The Constitution of the Czech Republic. https://www.hrad.cz/en/czech-republic/con-
stitution-of-the-cr (29.09.2019).
34 The Fundamental Law of Hungary. https://www.kormany.hu/download/f/3e/61000/
TheFundamentalLawofHungary_20180629_FIN.pdf (29.09.2019).
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VI.
Referring to the thesis of the article it should be concluded that the char-
acter of Czech and Hungarian constitutions does reflect the view on de-
mocracy represented by political elites that were responsible for passing 
the Constitutions. The foundation of the 1992 Czech Constitution mirrors 
a deep democratic idea derived from the 1920 Constitution, interwar dem-
ocratic tradition and transformation attitude towards reception of liberal 
democratic regime. While historically 2011 Hungarian Fundamental Law 
cannot refer to any democratic period before 1989 because there was nev-
er a longer period of democracy in this country before the transformation. 
So, the first democratic experiences come from the 1989–2010. The polit-
ical elites preferred conservative, Christian, communitarian and illiberal 
values rather than liberal ones.
In the beginning of the article I asked about the conditions which ac-
companied the process of working on and passing the constitutions in the 
Czech Republic and Hungary. The Czech Constitution was prepared and 
passed just before the emergence of the Czech Republic during the pro-
cess of Czechoslovakia splitting. In the term of theory of democratization, 
it was in the transition stage. All Czech parliamentary parties worked on 
the Constitution and impacted the contents of it. There was a broad pub-
lic and political consensus on the idea of democratic Constitution. Finally, 
the Constitution was accepted just three years after the collapse of social-
ism. The Hungarian Constitutional order was established on the ground 
of 1949 Constitution and was accepted by the agreement between socialist 
elite and opposition in 1989. Fidesz did not recognize it. But for 20 years the 
1989 Constitution has served as a guideline for state and citizens. In 2011 
Fidesz decided to change constitutional order and did it without the accep-
tance of all oppositional parties and groups.
The second question referred to the specific content, form and position of 
Czech and Hungarian Constitutions countries regarded from contemporary 
perspective in the light of the quality of democracy and its stagnation. In the 
Czech Republic the name of the highest act is Constitution while in Hunga-
ry the creators of such act wanted to underline own specific background call-
ing this act the Fundamental Act. The Czech Constitutional order includes 
404 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2019/5
the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Basic Freedoms from 1991 and the 
Constitution from 1992. Each act is divided in chapters and paragraphs. The 
Hungarian Fundamental Act has five different chapters and each of them is 
divided in differently named parts. From axiological point of view the Czech 
Constitution bases on liberal democratic ground, while the Hungarian one 
mirrors illiberal and conservative values. From institutional perspective both 
constitutions guarantee democratic regime, but in Hungarian case the posi-
tion of government is stronger35.
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